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SAVING FISH TO SAVE THE BAY: PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE PROTECTION FOR 
MENHADEN’S FOUNDATIONAL 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN THE 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 
Patrick J. Connolly* 
Abstract: The Chesapeake Bay menhaden population provides a number 
of ecosystem services that help keep the bay’s waters suitable for marine 
life, and enjoyable and profitable for the bay’s human users. Overfishing 
of menhaden within the bay may, however, be eroding the ability of the 
species to provide these services, which are foundational to rights trad-
itionally secured by the public trust doctrine: fishery, commerce, and 
navigation. The Virginia courts’ failure to protect these foundational 
ecosystem services threatens the viability and sustainability of these public 
trust rights. Given the chance, Virginia courts should protect menhaden 
by expanding the state’s narrow conception of the public trust doctrine to 
comport with developments in ecology and state constitutional, statutory, 
and case law. 
Introduction 
 A system of environmental law based on ecology has been evolving 
in tandem with the public’s growing understanding of the interde-
pendence of nature’s processes over the past fifty years.1 During the 
same period, the state of Virginia has witnessed the collapse of its once-
robust menhaden fishery.2 An individual menhaden—diminutive, oily, 
and bone-filled—would not excite the interest of a typical angler or sea-
food connoisseur.3 This unassuming fish, however, might be the most 
                                                                                                                      
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–09. 
1 See Richard O. Brooks, Ross Jones & Ross A. Virginia, Law and Ecology 4 
(2002). 
2 See, e.g., Kathy Bergren Smith, The Omega Men, Nat’l Fisherman, Nov. 1, 2006, at 28. 
3 See H. Bruce Franklin, The Most Important Fish in the Sea 26 (2007); Sara Jean 
Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden (Brevoortia Tyranus) in Chesapeake Bay 
and Implications for Management of the Fishery 6 (1998) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Uni-
versity of Maryland) (on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review) 
[hereinafter Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden]. 
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ecologically essential creature in the Chesapeake Bay waters that make 
up part of its natural range.4 
 Massive schools of menhaden amount to aquatic dynamos, per-
forming the ecosystem functions of pollution control, nutrient fixation, 
and food web support.5 These functions provide human users of the 
Chesapeake Bay ecosystem with the services of clean water, food pro-
duction, and recreational opportunities.6 Although a Chesapeake Bay 
stripped of these and other essential ecosystem services would be a pale 
shadow of a historic and bountiful water-body, no clear legal theory has 
emerged to guard people’s interest in them.7 This Note argues that the 
foundational ecosystem services provided by menhaden fall beneath 
the protective cloak of the public trust doctrine without bursting the 
utilitarian seams of the doctrine’s traditional protection of the public’s 
right to access navigable waters to engage in fishing, navigation, and 
commerce.8 
I. Ecosystem Services 
A. Ecosystem Services in General 
 Ecosystem services “represent the benefits human populations de-
rive, directly or indirectly,” from “the habitat, biological or system 
properties or processes of ecosystems.”9 Benefits derived from ecosys-
tem services are fundamental to the health of the global economy and 
to the survival of humankind.10 Severe degradation of certain ecosys-
                                                                                                                      
4 See, e.g., James Price, Chesapeake Bay Ecological Foundation, Inc., Exploitation 
of Atlantic Menhaden Threatens Restoration of Chesapeake Bay (2008), http:// 
www.chesbay.org/articles/4.asp. 
5 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 7–9. 
6 See Robert Costanza et al., Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 
Nature, May 15, 1997, at 253–54, 254 tbl.1. 
7 See Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine 
in Search of a Theory, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393, 395 (1991). 
8 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working 
Change from Within, 15 Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 223, 230 (2006). The authors argue that 
“[p]rotecting ecosystems . . . is compatible with the [public trust] doctrine even in its 
sharpest utilitarian projection.” Id. 
9 Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 253. 
10 See id. at 254–55. “It is trivial to ask what is the value of the atmosphere to human-
kind, or what is the value of rocks and soil infrastructure as support systems. Their value is 
infinite in total.” Id. at 255. 
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tem services would prove catastrophic and irreversible.11 For example, 
a process present in functional rural ecosystems is the movement of 
pollen from one flower to another; from this process humans derive 
the ecosystem service of pollination, which is essential to sustaining life 
on earth.12 A less-apparent, but similarly essential ecosystem service is 
nutrient cycling, that is, the fixation of nitrogen and phosphorus within 
soils, plants, and animals.13 Another example is waste treatment, like 
that provided by filter-feeding marine animals such as menhaden and 
mollusks,14 and by water filtration within forests.15 
 Recent natural disasters, including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
and the Asian tsunamis, have brought the essentiality of these services 
to human survival out of the realm of the theoretical and into stark 
focus.16 Had governments in areas struck by the 2004 tsunami or the 
2005 Gulf-Coast hurricanes done more to preserve the ecosystem ser-
vices of storm mitigation and flood control provided by natural geo-
logic formations and vegetation, the loss of life and physical devasta-
tion suffered in those areas could have been significantly lessened.17 
                                                                                                                      
11 See James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. Land 
Use & Envtl. L. 133, 133–34 (2006). Technological advances would likely be of little help 
in this situation. Id. “Biosphere II [failed] to establish biological systems capable of recreat-
ing the basic services that support life itself—services such as purification of air and water, 
pest control, renewal of soil fertility, climate regulation, pollination of crops and vegeta-
tion, and waste detoxification and decomposition.” Id. at 133. 
12 See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 tbl.1. Other familiar and essential ecosystem 
services are the production of food—such as fish and crops—and raw materials, like lum-
ber and fuel. See id. 
13 See id. 
14 William J. Hargis, Jr. & Dexter S. Haven, Chesapeake Oyster Reefs, Their Importance, De-
struction and Guidelines for Restoring Them, in Oyster Reef Habitat Restoration: A Syn-
opsis and Synthesis of Approaches 329, 348 (M.W. Luckenbach et al. eds., 1999). It has 
taken around 150 years for over-fishing, pollution, and shell mining to reduce the bay’s 
oyster population to about one percent of its historical peak, leaving menhaden to shoul-
der a heavy load in terms of purifying the bay’s water. See id. at 329, 339; Franklin, supra 
note 3, at 136–37. 
15 See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 256 tbl.2. Constructing an exhaustive list of eco-
system services is beyond the scope of this Note and may be impossible. See id. at 258. 
16 See Dennis Hirsch, Editorial, Wetlands’ Importance Now Made Clear, Atlanta J.-
Const., Sept. 12, 2005, at A11; Paddy Woodworth, What Price Ecological Restoration?, Scien-
tist, Apr. 1 2006, at 38, 39. 
17 See Woodworth, supra note 16, at 39. The author describes how preserving the man-
grove forests in Asia and the natural barrier islands in Louisiana could have prevented the 
most violent harm to infrastructure in those locations. Id. 
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B. Valuing Ecosystem Services 
 The value of ecosystem services to human populations is generally 
unrepresented in financial markets.18 Instead, these essential natural 
functions are enjoyed as public goods, their value obscured in the 
economy as positive externalities.19 It is usually not until an ecosystem 
service is severely degraded or destroyed that economists and policy-
makers recognize their value, then quantifiable as the cost of lives 
lost,20 communities disrupted, and infrastructure destroyed.21 The con-
tinued effort to repair the social fabric and infrastructure of New Or-
leans in the wake of the 2005 hurricanes provides a poignant exam-
ple.22 Much of the estimated $100 billion reconstruction cost and 
unquantifiable cost of lives and social capital lost could have been 
avoided by a $14 billion expenditure to restore the barrier islands that 
serve as a natural buffer to the Gulf Coast during storms.23 
 Ecological economists have taken on the daunting task of quanti-
fying the value derived by humans from dozens of ecosystem services 
whose benefits we do not purchase in a marketplace.24 A controversial 
initial effort in 1997, led by Robert Costanza, valued these services at 
$33 trillion, with marine services contributing just under two-thirds of 
that amount.25 
 While the exact value of worldwide ecosystem services is a matter 
open to debate—Costanza’s conservative estimate assigned a mone-
tary value greater than combined global GDP—there is little doubt 
that the human race would cease to exist should certain ecosystem 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Salzman, supra note 11, at 134. 
19 See id. at 135. 
20 See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841, 869–71 
(2006) (discussing the thorny issue of assigning monetary value to human life). 
21 See Salzman, supra note 11, at 135. 
22 See Woodworth, supra note 16, at 39; see also Michèle Alexandre, “Love Don’t Live Here 
Anymore”: Economic Incentives for a More Equitable Model of Urban Redevelopment, 35 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 36–37 (2008) (describing Hurricane Katrina’s devastating effect on 
the social fabric of New Orleans, especially with respect to the poor and people of color). 
23 Woodworth, supra note 16, at 39. 
24 Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 253. 
25 See id. at 259. Moreover, Costanza’s study attributed an annual value of about $2.3 
trillion to waste treatment, and $17 trillion to nutrient cycling. Id. Menhaden are key pro-
viders of both of these services in the Chesapeake Bay. See Franklin, supra note 3, at 8; 
Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 73–74. 
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services become unavailable.26 To the best of our knowledge, humans 
are not yet on the brink of extinction, but our depletion of the wealth 
bestowed upon us by nature has gone far to erode our quality of life 
and that of future generations.27 Some costs of ecosystem service deg-
radation are more subtle than those exemplified by the Asian tsunami 
or the recent Gulf Coast hurricanes, but each such cost amounts to an 
incremental degradation in local, regional, and global qualities of life 
and in the economies and traditions that underpin the same.28 
II. The Chesapeake Bay Menhaden Fishery 
A. The Fish: A Classic Overachiever 
 Adult menhaden weigh less than two pounds and grow to a maxi-
mum of about nineteen inches in length.29 The species is known for 
plentiful bones and oily flesh, and does not grace the menus of popular 
seafood restaurants, or even the bun of the plebeian Filet-o-Fish.30 Mil-
lions-strong schools of these unpalatable fish, however, are essential 
components of the ecosystems in which they swim.31 Generally speak-
ing, menhaden serve two functions in marine ecology: (1) as filter 
feeders, they serve to clarify and detoxify the water; and (2) they are an 
essential part of the diets of numerous predators and scavengers within 
the food web.32 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Peter Barnes, Who Owns the Sky? Our Common Assets and the Future of 
Capitalism 39–40 (2001). 
27 See id. 
28 See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 255. “The chains of effects from ecosystem ser-
vices to human welfare can range from extremely simple to exceedingly complex. Forests 
provide timber, but also hold soils and moisture, and create microclimates, all of which 
contribute to human welfare in complex, and generally nonmarketed ways.” Id. Similarly, 
the value of a population of a certain species of fish may be quantified in the revenues of 
the associated commercial fishery, while ignoring the value of the ecosystem services that 
species provides as fodder for larger species in the food web, or as a water purifier. See id. 
29 See Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 6. 
30 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 3, at 5; McDonald’s USA Ingredients Listing for Popu-
lar Menu Items, http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/bagamcmeal/ingredientslist.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2009) (listing Hoki and/or Pollock as the main ingredient(s) in the 
McDonald’s fish patty). 
31 See, e.g., Price, supra note 4. 
32 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 7–9; Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, 
supra note 3, at 3, 7. 
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1. Menhaden’s Water Purification Role 
 Historically, a prolific menhaden population along with seem-
ingly endless reefs of filter-feeding oysters on the floor of the Chesa-
peake served as a dynamic water-purifying tag team.33 The fish and 
mollusks combined to keep the Chesapeake’s waters “clear, clean, bal-
anced, and healthy . . . .”34 Now, with the oyster population of Chesa-
peake Bay at around one percent of its historic level,35 menhaden 
have become the most important filter feeder in the bay.36 
 Filter-feeding serves multiple ecosystem functions.  First, menhaden 
help create suitable conditions for marine life by filtering suspended 
phytoplankton, zooplankton, and detritus from the water, thereby clarify-
ing the bay and allowing sunlight to nourish aquatic plants which release 
dissolved oxygen.37 Second, menhaden consume algae that grow ram-
pantly in the bay, preventing decomposition of dead algae from con-
suming dissolved oxygen that is essential to marine life.38 Menhaden 
further help prevent the spread of oxygen-starved dead zones by con-
suming nitrogen,39 which stimulates algae growth after being flushed 
into the bay from agricultural and municipal non-point sources.40 
 Degradation of the menhaden resource will lead to a decrease in 
the ecosystem functions of water purification and nitrogen fixation 
which it provides, leading to more frequent toxic algae blooms and ex-
                                                                                                                      
33 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 136–37. 
34 Id. at 9. 
35 See Hargis & Haven, supra note 14, at 329, 350; Fred Carroll, Two Schools of Thought: 
Scientific Uncertainty, Ecological Warnings, Corporate Maneuvering and Showdown Politics Result 
in a Big Stink over a Small Fish, Daily Press, July 2, 2006, at A1. 
36 Price, supra note 4. 
37 Franklin, supra note 3, at 43; see Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, 
supra note 3, at 1. 
38 Dick Russell, Striper Wars 239 (2005). Menhaden feed on these potentially de-
structive algae, turning it into flesh with which they swim out of the bay as they travel 
throughout their natural range along the eastern Atlantic seaboard. See Dick Russell, The 
Beating Heart of the Estuary: Demand for Fish Oil Puts the Chesapeake Under Increasing Pressure, 
Earth Island J., Winter 2006, at 31, 35 [hereinafter The Beating Heart of the Estuary]; 
Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
39 Price, supra note 4. 
40 Brooks, Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 271–72; see Committee on Environ-
mental and Natural Resources, National Science and Technology Council, An 
Assessment of Coastal Hypoxia and Eutrophication in U.S. Waters 1–2 (2003) 
[hereinafter NSTC Assessment]. “More than 64,000 square miles of land drain into the 
rivers that feed the [Chesapeake] Bay. . . . [T]he two largest contributors of both nitrogen 
and phosphorus are agriculture and point sources.” Id. at 42. 
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pansion of creeping dead zones in the bay.41 The effect on the humans 
who exploit the bay’s resources, both in terms of their economic well-
being and the stability of their cultures and traditions, could be enor-
mous.42 Toxic algae and dead zones are already taking their toll on the 
culturally and economically important traditions of crab- and shell-
fishing in the bay.43 
2. Menhaden’s Role in the Chesapeake’s Complex Food Web 
 In addition to their role as filter feeders, menhaden are perhaps 
the most essential link in the Chesapeake Bay’s complex food web, 
serving as “the dominant prey species for many predatory fish and 
mammals such as striped bass, bluefish, weakfish, Spanish mackerel, 
seals, and whales; [and as] a favorite target for the common loon, her-
ons, egrets, ospreys, and eagles.”44 Sport fishermen and bird watchers 
point to a dwindling menhaden population in the Chesapeake Bay as 
a driving factor in the inability of their favorite species to rebound 
from diminished levels.45 Wasting disease in Chesapeake Bay striped 
bass, a popular target for recreational anglers, may be attributable to 
malnutrition from a lack of menhaden to feed on.46 
 Menhaden’s purification of the Chesapeake’s water and their es-
sential role in the bay’s complex food web are foundational services, 
crucial to the diverse species who inhabit the bay ecosystem and to 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 137–40; NSTC Assessment, supra note 40, at 24–26. 
42 See Carroll, supra note 35, at A1. 
43 See id. (noting that, while the sea scallop industry accounted for $289 million in di-
rect and indirect sales in Virginia in 2005, and the blue crab industry for $46 million, the 
menhaden industry only generated $33 million in such sales); David A. Fahrenthold, Resto-
ration Push Failing Chesapeake Crabs, Boston Globe, Nov. 19, 2007, at A2 (citing dead zones 
as a major obstacle to rebuilding the traditional blue crab fishery throughout the bay); 
Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 84–85 (noting that 
“[f]ishery management in the Chesapeake Bay historically has been more crisis manage-
ment than anything else” and pointing out the long-suffering oyster, striper, and blue crab 
fisheries). 
44 Price, supra note 4. 
45 See Russell, supra note 38, at 227. 
46 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 144–45; Russell, supra note 38. at 27–30, 230; 
Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 83. Fish suffering from 
wasting disease are severely underweight, have skin lesions, and may display damage to 
internal organs. See Russell, supra note 38, at 202–04. 
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the people who rely on that ecosystem for its commercial, recrea-
tional, and aesthetic bounties.47 
B. Menhaden’s History: Centuries of Providing Ecosystem Services 
1. The Commercial Menhaden Fishery: from Boom to (Almost) Bust 
 Menhaden have a rich history of facilitating development in 
North America, dating back to when Native Americans taught the Pil-
grims to fertilize their corn with dead fish.48 The menhaden fishery 
evolved from these low-technology beginnings as the fish’s oil became 
popular for industrial applications in the early nineteenth century.49 
In the years following the Civil War, menhaden oil fully supplanted 
whale oil in many of its commercial applications,50 and brought riches 
to the seaside hamlet of Reedville, Virginia, then—as it is today—the 
hub of the Atlantic coast menhaden fishery.51 
 The introduction of purse seine nets, used to encircle and scoop 
entire schools of menhaden out of the water, increased the fishery’s 
efficiency and had Virginia’s commercial menhaden business booming 
by the start of the twentieth century.52 Whale oil could not compete 
with the far cheaper menhaden product, and ground fish carcasses re-
placed other, more expensive forms of fertilizer.53 High demand for 
menhaden products, coupled with the ruthless efficiency of steamships, 
purse seine netting, and integration with on-shore factories created vast 
wealth for those at the helm of the industry at ports along the eastern 
seaboard.54 
 In addition to applications for their oil and as fertilizer, the early 
twentieth century saw protein-rich menhaden dried, ground, and sold 
as feed for land-based livestock.55 The Atlantic commercial menhaden 
                                                                                                                      
47 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 3, at 7. “[M]enhaden play dual roles in marine ecol-
ogy perhaps unmatched anywhere on the planet.” Id. 
48 See, e.g., Russell, supra note 38, at 218. 
49 See id. at 218–19. 
50 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 60–61. 
51 See id. at 56–57, 64. 
52 See Russell, supra note 38, at 218–21. 
53 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 61–62. 
54 See id. at 61, 64. 
55 See Russell, supra note 38, at 219. 
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fishery reached its peak in 1956, when 1.6 billion pounds were taken.56 
Most of this startling amount was used by the “reduction” industry— 
apparently named without a hint of irony—which extracted the oil 
from the catch for its industrial applications and sold the carcasses as 
fertilizer and livestock feed.57 The twentieth century saw a remarkable 
diversification in the uses of the reduction industry’s products.58 Dick 
Russell points out that, “[a]s Rachel Carson once put it, ‘Almost every 
person in the United States has at some time eaten, used, or worn 
something made from menhaden.’”59 
 The most important innovation in the fishery, whose history is 
marked by technological “improvements,” was the post-World War II 
implementation of spotter planes to find dense schools of menha-
den.60 The planes function in largely the same manner today.61 Small, 
agile boats follow a plane’s directions to a viable school and surround 
it with a high-capacity nylon purse seine net.62 A larger boat then vac-
uums the net’s contents—as many as 300,000 menhaden in one 
haul—into its hold.63 
 As a result of the reduction industry’s efficient tactics, the menha-
den population along the east coast has fallen to about eighty percent 
below normal.64 Spurred by concerns of over-fishing, most Atlantic 
states banned the reduction industry’s seining operations from their 
coastal waters long ago.65 Virginia and North Carolina are the only 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 123. 
57 Id. at 122–23, 189. 
58 See Russell, supra note 38, at 219. 
59 Id. Russell highlights the ubiquity of menhaden products in the life of the American 
consumer: 
It’s in Rustoleum and Friskies Fancy Feast and Pepperidge Farm shortcake 
cookies and Soothing Seas Aromatherapy body cream. The oil has been used 
in the manufacturing of soap, linoleum, waterproof fabrics, and certain kinds 
of paint. With its high percentage of polyunsaturated fats, menhaden oil has 
also been popular for many years in Europe as a cooking oil, as well as to 
make margarine and shortenings. 
Id. 
60 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 120–21. 
61 See Russell, supra note 38, at 221. 
62 See The Beating Heart of the Estuary, supra note 38, at 32. 
63 See id. 
64 See Lee Tolliver, Va. House Rejects Bid to Let VMRC Manage Menhaden, Va. Pilot & 
Ledger Star, Jan. 30, 2005, at C11. 
65 See The Beating Heart of the Estuary, supra note 38, at 32–33. 
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states that allow the reduction fleet to operate in their inshore waters.66 
Even in the states where it is still allowed, the reduction industry has 
severely contracted along with the declining menhaden population.67 
2. The Present-Day Menhaden Reduction Industry 
 The present-day menhaden reduction industry is monopolized by 
a single corporation: Omega Protein, Inc.68 The company operates 
three menhaden processing plants along the Gulf Coast, and one in 
Reedville, Virginia.69 Omega’s annual menhaden landings at the Reed-
ville plant from 2001 through 2003 averaged 415 million pounds.70 
That amount of fish—caught by Omega’s purse-seine reduction fleet— 
is “equal to five times the amount of seafood that the entire Maryland 
commercial fishery is able to land—counting oysters, clams, fish, every-
thing.”71 
 Most of Omega Protein’s catch is dried and ground into fish meal 
to be sold “as a protein ingredient in animal feed for swine, cattle, 
aquaculture and household pets.”72 Omega also sells menhaden oil as 
an industrial component, a food additive, a dietary supplement, and 
as liquid protein for animal and aquaculture feeds.73 Whatever is left 
after the fish meal and fish oil are produced might end up in livestock 
feed, or as “organic” fertilizer.74 Every menhaden that winds up in a 
                                                                                                                      
66 Franklin, supra note 3, at 189. 
67 See Carroll, supra note 35, at A1. 
68 Franklin, supra note 3, at 190; Carroll, supra note 35, at A1. Omega is organized 
under Nevada law and has its principal executive offices in Houston, Texas. Omega Pro-
tein Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 1 (Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Omega Quar-
terly Report]. For succinct descriptions of the historical oddities, strokes of luck, and cast 
of characters—including a former U.S. president and a real estate tycoon—that have been 
involved with Omega’s rise to monopoly, see Franklin, supra note 3, at 126–29 and Rus-
sell, supra note 38, at 223–25. 
69 Omega Quarterly Report, supra note 68, at 23. 
70 See Russell, supra note 38, at 225. 
71 Id. (emphasis added). 
72 Omega Quarterly Report, supra note 68, at 23. A perverse positive feedback loop re-
sults, in which chickens eat menhaden-based feed, then produce nitrogen-rich manure 
which runs off into the bay, where it stimulates algae growth that can cause hypoxia in the 
water and disease outbreaks in menhaden. Russell, supra note 38, at 234. 
73 See Omega Quarterly Report, supra note 68, at 23. 
74 See id. 
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sack of chicken feed or fertilizer, a vitamin capsule,75 or a linoleum 
floor is one less menhaden providing foundational ecosystem services 
within the Chesapeake Bay, thereby detracting from the bank of natu-
ral capital stored in that system.76 
C. The Reduction Industry Erodes Foundational Ecosystem Services  
in the Chesapeake Bay 
 The disappearance of menhaden predators from areas where they 
were once plentiful,77 the appearance of sickly striped bass whose stom-
achs are empty for lack of forage,78 and biologists who vehemently dis-
agree with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) 
assessment of the menhaden stock as healthy all suggest that menha-
den are being over-fished within the Chesapeake Bay.79 Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that banning the reduction industry’s boats and planes 
from the Chesapeake, or at least reducing their operations, could help 
to restore healthier levels of ecosystem services.80 New Jersey enjoyed a 
“remarkable resurgence” of menhaden and associated predators in 
2001 following its action to ban Omega’s boats from its waters.81 
 Calls from environmentalists and sport fishermen for a morato-
rium on purse-seining in Virginia’s Chesapeake waters—in order to 
allow menhaden to spawn before being vacuumed out of the sea— 
have met predictably strong opposition from Omega.82 Omega claims 
that it is an overabundance of striped bass, not over-fishing, that is 
                                                                                                                      
75 Omega has made substantial investment in OmegaPure, the company’s food grade 
omega-3 fatty acid product line. See id. at 27. While omega-3 fatty acids are unquestionably 
beneficial to human health, there are a number of alternatives to squeezing them out of 
menhaden, perhaps most notably extracting them directly from algae like those in the 
menhaden’s diet which make their flesh rich in omega-3 fatty acids. Franklin, supra note 
3, at 211–13. 
76 See generally Woodworth, supra note 16 (making the point that preservation of natu-
ral ecosystem functions results in enormous long-term economic benefits). 
77 See The Beating Heart of the Estuary, supra note 38, at 35. 
78 See, e.g., Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 81–83. 
79 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 216–18; Russell, supra note 38, at 29–30; Price, supra 
note 4. 
80 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 99, 218–19. 
81 Id. at 99. Similarly, in Maine, some have credited a summer-long ban on midwater 
trawling for herring—a close relative of menhaden—with the recovery of that species in 
the Gulf of Maine, along with a marked increase in the presence of whales, dolphins, sea-
birds, and tuna. Tom Bell, Hip-Deep in Herring, Portland Press Herald, Sept. 11, 2007, at 
C1. 
82 See Russell, supra note 38, at 29–30; Carroll, supra note 37, at A1. 
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reducing the menhaden population in the Chesapeake.83 The indus-
try points to their continued ability to catch millions of pounds of fish 
as evidence that the stock of menhaden is in fact healthy.84 
 Assessments of the health of the menhaden population based on 
landings are meaningless, however.85 The efficiency of Omega’s opera-
tion—which employs spotter planes to find worthwhile schools and 
purse seines to corral those schools all at once—ensures that catch lev-
els can be temporarily maintained while the actual stock of fish within 
the bay continues to plummet.86 This phenomenon is called “inverse 
catchability,” and means that each successive haul of the purse seine 
removes a larger percentage of the remaining menhaden from the 
Chesapeake.87 Continuing to allow spotter planes to hunt down scarcer 
schools of menhaden—comprised mostly of juvenile fish that have not 
yet spawned—could lead to “an all-out population crash.”88 
D. Menhaden Management: A Sop to a Floundering Industry 
 Menhaden are the only saltwater fish in Virginia not managed by 
the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC).89 Rather, men-
haden management seems to be a task that is jealously guarded by the 
Virginia state legislature.90 Mounting pressure from a coalition of en-
vironmentalists and recreational fishermen—the latter of which “ac-
count for about two-thirds of the total sales generated by Virginia’s $1 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Russell, supra note 38, at 228. 
84 See id. at 229. Omega acknowledges that its “business is totally dependent on its an-
nual menhaden harvest[,]” and that its “ability to meet its raw material requirements 
through its annual menhaden harvest fluctuates from year to year and month to month, 
due to natural conditions over which the company has no control.” Omega Quarterly Report, supra 
note 68, at 42–43 (emphasis added). 
85 See Russell, supra note 38, at 229. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Scott Harper, Regulatory Plight of Tiny Fish Could Have Big Repercussions, Virginian 
Pilot, Dec. 29, 2004, at A16. 
89 Tolliver, supra note 64, at C11; see Va. Code Ann. §§ 28.2-100 to -103, 28.2-400 to -411 
(2007). 
90 See Va. Code Ann. §§ 28.2-400 to -411; Harper, supra note 88, at A16 (noting that 
many think “years of political leverage and campaign contributions” from the reduction 
industry have made meaningful regulation from the legislature very unlikely); Tolliver, 
supra note 64, at C11. 
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billion fishing industry”91—finally led the legislature to adopt the first 
ever catch limit on menhaden in 2006.92 
 The measure allows the reduction industry to catch 109,000 metric 
tons annually through 2010, and up to 122,740 metric tons—over four-
hundred million fish93—in a year, as long as it shaves the excess off the 
following year’s cap.94 The cap was supported by the Omega Corpora-
tion.95 It is likely that the catch limit was palatable to Omega because it 
preserved management of the menhaden reduction fishery in the in-
dustry-friendly state legislature, as opposed to the VMRC, and because 
the alternative might have been a complete shutdown of the menhaden 
fishery by the federal government in response to the legislature’s failure 
to enact ASMFC limits.96 That the 109,000 metric ton catch limit was 
determined by averaging the reduction industry’s most recent landing 
data also may have played a role in winning the company’s support.97 
III. The Public Trust Doctrine 
A. Hatching the Public Trust Doctrine 
 A brief discussion of the public trust doctrine’s roots will help 
ground the remainder of the discussion.98 The public trust doctrine, as 
understood in the United States, is typically traced back to around 530 
A.D. and the Roman civil law’s recognition that the general public had 
inalienable rights to access and use certain resources, namely the sea 
and seashore, rivers, and the air.99 These resources were to be held as 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Carroll, supra note 35, at A1. 
92 Va. Code Ann. § 28.2-1000.2 (2007); see Franklin, supra note 3, at 201–02; Editorial, 
Frozen Fishing, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 2006, at B6. 
93 See Omega Protein Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Mar. 13, 2007). The 
National Marine Fisheries Service fish catch conversion ratio for menhaden is 670 pounds 
per 1000 fish. Id. 
94 Va. Code Ann. § 28.2-1000.2 (2007). 
95 Frozen Fishing, supra note 92. 
96 See Carroll, supra note 37, at A1; Frozen Fishing, supra note 92. 
97 See Tom Pelton, Menhaden Matter, and They’re in Trouble, Balt. Sun, May 6, 2007, at 
5F. 
98 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 475–78 (1970) [hereinafter Sax I] (providing a history of 
the public trust doctrine in Roman and English law). 
99 See George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural 
Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 307, 310 (2006). 
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common property, invulnerable to private ownership.100 These ideals 
made their way into the laws of most European countries during the 
Middle Ages and, significantly, into the common law of England.101 
During the thirteenth century, England established that “the shores of 
the sea [were] ‘common to all’ and inalienable.”102 Navigation and fish-
ing were the primary public benefits sought to be preserved by giving 
the public inalienable property rights in the sea, seashore, and land 
underlying the sea.103 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine Jumps the Pond 
 The public trust doctrine debuted in the United States in Martin v. 
Waddell, an 1842 Supreme Court case concerning a disputed New Jersey 
oyster bed.104 There, the Court ruled that “the great right of dominion 
and ownership in the rivers, bays and arms of the sea . . . [and] the 
right of common fishery for the common people” were “immediately 
and rightfully vested in the state” after independence.105 These tradi-
tional British rights must have been intended to be held in trust for the 
common benefit of new settlers, otherwise few British subjects could 
have been convinced to make the trip to establish the new colonies.106 
Therefore, following independence, title to traditional public trust 
properties formerly held by the English crown or parliament was vested 
in the state governments, subject to the restraints on alienation inher-
ent in the trust.107 The ruling stressed the centuries-old policy of pre-
serving the right to take shell- and finfish, among other “benefits and 
advantages of the navigable waters” for use by the general public.108 
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. 
101 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 634–35 (1986). 
102 Id. at 635. 
103 See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrat-
ing Standards, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 702 (2006). 
104 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 407 (1842). 
105 See id. at 416. 
106 See Bonnie J. McCay, Oyster Wars and The Public Trust 66 (1998). 
107 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 416; Klass, supra note 103, at 703. 
108 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 414. In a statement that turned out to be ahead of its time, the 
Court even alluded to the impropriety of a decision that would prevent a resident from 
bathing in public trust waters “without becoming a trespasser upon the rights of another.” 
Id. 
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 Decided fifty years after Martin v. Waddell, the guiding case in 
United States public trust doctrine jurisprudence is Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.109 There, the Court ruled that a state’s title to 
lands beneath navigable waters is “held in trust for the people of the 
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on com-
merce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the 
obstruction or interference of private parties.”110 The Court went on 
to declare that state governments, as trustees of public trust property, 
cannot relinquish control over such property unless such disposal 
promotes the interests of the public, and does not “substantial[ly] im-
pair[] . . . the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”111 
 Two years after Illinois Central, the Supreme Court ruled in Shively v. 
Bowlby that, as compared to the thirteen original states, “[t]he new states 
admitted into the Union since the adoption of the constitution have the 
same rights as the original states in the tide waters, and in the lands un-
der them, within their respective jurisdictions.”112 Strongly endorsing 
the ruling in Martin v. Waddell, the Court recognized the value of these 
resources to the public for the purposes of “commerce, navigation, and 
fishery.”113 It followed that new states would hold title and control over 
public trust resources, “for the benefit of the whole people.”114 
 Illinois Central and Shively do not say whether state or federal law 
is the source of limitations on what a state can do with its public trust 
resources.115 Courts and legal scholars have theorized that the deci-
sions rested either solely on state law, solely on federal law of various 
stripes, or on some interaction of the two.116 While it is unlikely that 
                                                                                                                      
109 See, e.g., Smith & Sweeney, supra note 99, at 312–13. 
110 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
111 Id. at 453. In defining its substantial impairment standard, the court in Illinois Cen-
tral stated that, “[C]ontrol of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, ex-
cept as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can 
be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and 
waters remaining.” Id. 
112 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). 
113 Id. at 15–18, 57. 
114 Id. at 57. 
115 See Klass, supra note 103, at 704–05. The author notes that this ambiguity arose in 
the context of the continued search for “federal general common law,” which was not 
abandoned until 1938 in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Id. at 705. 
116 See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source 
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 425, 459–62 (1989). 
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the Illinois Central decision rested solely on Illinois state law,117 the ju-
risprudence that has emerged gives deference to state law in defining 
the precise contours of the public trust doctrine.118 States can define 
the details of their public trust doctrine—markedly expanding its pro-
tections if so desired—as long as they do not afford less protection 
than that mandated by Illinois Central and Shively, thereby “abrogating 
the public trust entirely.”119 
C. The Doctrine Walks on Land (and Takes to the Sky?) in the United States 
1. Common Law Public Trust Doctrine Through 1970 
 In his seminal 1970 article, Joseph L. Sax described his vision for 
the role of the judiciary in developing the public trust doctrine after 
tracing the doctrine’s historical roots and evolution within particular 
states.120 Sax paid particular attention to the development of the doc-
trine in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California.121 Sax found that 
these states’ courts had frequently resorted to public trust principles 
in the interest of democracy, invalidating actions of state legislatures 
and agencies which furthered private commercial interests at the ex-
pense of public access to resources.122 Sax saw potential for the doc-
trine to encourage future democratization of legislative and adminis-
trative decisions with a tendency to unduly favor the interests of 
powerful minorities—such as utilities, developers, or commercial fish-
ing monopolists—at the expense of widely held, though diffuse, pub-
lic interests in natural resources.123 
 In Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts invalidated the grant of 4000 acres of the 
Greylock State Reservation by the Greylock Reservation Commission 
for the purpose of building a commercial ski resort.124 In Gould, the 
                                                                                                                      
117 See id. at 460. 
118 See id. at 461–62. 
119 See Klass, supra note 103, at 705; Wilkinson, supra note 116, at 464. 
120 See Sax I, supra note 98, at 551–53. 
121 See id. at 491, 509, 524. 
122 See id. at 491–92, 513, 540. Sax described the Wisconsin court as having successfully 
invoked the public trust as a means of “combat[ing] the tendency of the legislature and of 
administrative agencies to subordinate diffuse public advantages to pressing private inter-
ests.” Id. at 513. 
123 See id. at 558–59. 
124 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 116, 126 (Mass. 1966). 
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court protected the diffuse public interest in continued use of a pub-
lic park in the face of highly concentrated, well-funded private com-
mercial interests.125 By requiring that the grant of park land for a 
commercial enterprise be subject to explicit legislative authorization, 
the court ensured that “openness and visibility” in the legislative 
process would be there to preserve public trust resources from moti-
vated and influential private interests.126 
  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin invalidated administrative and legislative 
acts premised on the public utility of draining wetlands in the interest 
of expanding agriculture.127 In Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Im-
provement Co., the court cited favorably to Illinois Central and that case’s 
mandate that navigable waters be held in trust by the state for the 
public purposes of navigation and fishing.128 The court held that “the 
legislature had no power, under the guise of legislating for the public 
health, to authorize the destruction of a lake . . . to the great injury of 
the plaintiff as such riparian owner, for private purposes, and for the 
sole benefit of private parties.”129 
 In a later case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin invalidated the 
Railroad Commission’s plan for a levee and drainage system affecting 
navigable tributaries of the Mississippi River.130 The court ruled that 
the “substantial destruction” of the public rights of trapping, hunting, 
fishing, and navigation was not outweighed by the largely speculative 
benefits of agricultural reclamation urged by the Railroad Commis-
sion.131 In these Wisconsin cases, the court refused to defer to the leg-
islature or administrative agencies in situations where diffuse interests 
in access to public trust resources had been subordinated to concen-
trated, influential private interests.132 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Sax I, supra note 98, at 494–95. 
126 See id. at 495–96. 
127 Id. at 509–10. 
128 Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 922 (Wis. 1896). 
129 Id. 
130 In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874, 878 (Wis. 1924). 
131 See id. 
132 See Sax I, supra note 98, at 514. 
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2. Post-1970 Expansion of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine 
 The history of the public trust doctrine in the United States subse-
quent to Sax’s groundbreaking article has generally been one of expan-
sion with respect to resources and purposes encompassed within the 
public trust doctrine.133 The doctrine’s evolution in several states seems 
to have corresponded with Sax’s contention that “protections which the 
courts have applied in conventional public trust cases would be equally 
applicable and equally appropriate in controversies involving air pollu-
tion, . . . pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, and strip 
mining . . . .”134 Sax’s progressive vision of the public trust doctrine 
converged with a growing awareness of problems posed by environ-
mental degradation to foster the doctrine’s evolution in the decades 
following 1970.135 
 Several state courts in the 1970s, led by the California Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marks v. Whitney, began acting in accordance with 
the theory that the public trust doctrine’s protections encompassed 
more than the public’s interest in the ultimate ends of navigation, 
commerce, and fishery.136 The court in Marks v. Whitney asserted the 
flexibility of the doctrine’s purposes and recognized “the preservation 
of [tidelands] in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecologi-
cal units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments 
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which 
favorably affect the scenery and climate of an area” as an essential 
public trust use.137 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 99, at 332 (noting that the public trust doctrine 
has been used to protect interests in “boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, preserving 
wildlife habitat, . . . aesthetic beauty, maintaining ecological integrity, and retaining open 
spaces, which are all seen today as part of ‘legitimate public expectations.’”); see also Laza-
rus, supra note 101, at 649. 
134 Sax I, supra note 98, at 556–57; see Klass, supra note 103, at 706–07. For an explana-
tion of Sax’s idea that the public trust doctrine should evolve to encompass diffuse inter-
ests in maintenance of stable ecosystems, see Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doc-
trine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185 (1980) [hereinafter Sax II]. Sax 
later argued that the public trust doctrine’s fundamental purpose is the protection of “ex-
pectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title.” Id. at 188. Rapid, 
destabilizing changes in such expectations have the potential to “provoke crises—social, 
biological and . . . economic.” Id. 
135 See Klass, supra note 103, at 707–08. 
136 See id. Many of the interests protected by state courts invoking the public trust doc-
trine are what ecological economists today would call ecosystem services. See Costanza et 
al., supra note 6, at 254 tbl.1. 
137 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
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 The Wisconsin Supreme Court struck an equally enlightened 
chord in Just v. Marinette County when it announced that, “under the 
trust doctrine [the state] has a duty to eradicate the present pollution 
and to prevent further pollution in its navigable waters.”138 The court 
recognized that healthy ecosystems are foundational to traditional pub-
lic trust values when it stated of the unremarkable wetlands in question: 
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, unde-
sirable, and not picturesque. But as the people became more 
sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired that swamps and 
wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of 
nature and are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes 
and streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of the 
ecological creation and now, even to the uninitiated, possess 
their own beauty in nature.139 
 In the same year that the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Just, 
a New York state court declared a number of wetlands-related ecosys-
tem services to be logically protected by the public trust doctrine.140 
The court reasoned that “[t]he entire ecological system supporting 
the waterways is an integral part of them . . . and must necessarily be 
included within the purview of the trust.”141 
3. Common Law Public Trust Doctrine from 1980 to the Present 
 Even after the environmental fervor of the 1970s ebbed, Califor-
nia courts continued to lead state efforts to protect diffuse public in-
terests in natural resources through the public trust doctrine.142 The 
California Supreme Court protected a number of ecosystem services 
via the public trust doctrine when it decided National Audubon Society 
v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake) in 1983.143 The court out-
                                                                                                                      
138 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972). 
139 Id. 
140 See People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 532–33 (N.Y. 
Dist. Ct. 1972). 
141 Id. at 532. The court recognized that if wetlands were not preserved so as to per-
form the ecosystem services of acting “as a buffer against the ravages of the sea, cleanser of 
the incoming tide, a base for the marine food chain, nesting grounds for birds and par-
ticularly endangered species and sanctuary to a variety of animals[,]” then efforts to pro-
tect more traditional public trust interests like fishing and navigation would be built upon 
shifting sands. See id. at 533. 
142 See Klass, supra note 103, at 710. 
143 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 
719 (Cal. 1983). 
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lined the ecological and aesthetic harms caused by the drop in water 
level and rise in salinity of Mono Lake resulting from diversions of 
fresh water to the city of Los Angeles: disruption of the food chain; 
extreme stresses on the migratory bird population; and harm to hu-
mans’ ability to enjoy the lake’s economic, scenic, and recreational 
values.144 The court in Mono Lake required the state to reexamine Los 
Angeles’ rights to divert fresh water from Mono Lake in light of the 
damage that practice was causing to the public interest in the ecologi-
cal and recreational integrity of that unique resource.145 
 More recently, the Supreme Court of Hawaii recognized that, as 
public values and needs have evolved, so too have the rights preserved 
in the public by the public trust doctrine.146 The Hawaii court ruled in 
In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch) that a statute regulat-
ing diversions of fresh water did not properly account for the public 
trust purpose of “the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional and 
customary rights[,]” and rejected the idea that preservation of waters in 
their natural state constitutes waste.147 The court went on to expressly 
reject “private commercial use as among the public purposes protected 
by the trust.”148 
 Sax’s expansive vision for the public trust doctrine, as developed 
by the courts of California and Hawaii, would most likely protect the 
public’s interest in the foundational ecosystem services provided by 
menhaden.149 As discussed below, however, the foundational ecosystem 
services provided by menhaden may be protected by even the most 
conservative reading of the public trust doctrine.150 
                                                                                                                      
144 See id. at 715–16. 
145 See id. at 732. 
146 In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000). 
147 Id. at 449. 
148 Id. at 450. Mono Lake’s consideration of ecological value and scenic beauty echoed 
throughout the court’s decision, as they required diversions of fresh water from Waiahole 
Ditch to be allocated with the long-term health of the estuary in mind. See id. at 470–71. 
Furthermore, the court rejected scientific uncertainty as to the effects of diversions on the 
ecosystem as a valid excuse for failure to exercise “reasonable precautionary presumptions 
or allowances in the public interest.” See id. at 471. “[T]he Commission must . . . incorpo-
rate[] elements of uncertainty and risk as part of its analysis. Such a methodology, by its 
nature, must rely as much on policy considerations as on hard scientific ‘facts.’” Id. 
149 See Sax I, supra note 98, at 556–57. 
150 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 8, at 236–37. 
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D. Spawning of the Public Trust Doctrine in Virginia 
1. Virginia’s Common Law Public Trust Doctrine 
a. Virginia Public Trust Cases From 1900–1932 
 The common law public trust doctrine was statutorily adopted in 
Virginia pursuant to section 1-200 of the Code of Virginia, which pro-
vides: “The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to 
the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Common-
wealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of 
decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.”151 
 During the early part of the twentieth century, Virginia courts 
addressed the scope of England’s common law public trust doctrine 
in a number of conflicts involving rights to use traditional public trust 
resources, often oyster beds and the waters covering them.152 In Taylor 
v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia drew on 
language from Illinois Central and other federal and state precedents 
to determine that “the navigable waters and the soil under them . . . 
are the property of the state, to be controlled by the state, in its own 
discretion, for the benefit of the people of the state . . . .”153 Taylor es-
tablished that a Virginia statute stating: 
All the beds of the bays, rivers, creeks, and the shores of the 
sea within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth . . . shall 
continue and remain the property of the commonwealth of 
Virginia, and may be used as a common by all the people of 
the state for the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of tak-
ing or catching oysters and other shellfish, subject to . . . any 
future laws that may be passed by the General Assembly 
had its proper foundation in the common law and merely restated 
preexisting Virginia common law.154 While Taylor restricted the legisla-
ture’s use of public trust resources to uses benefitting the public, the 
                                                                                                                      
151 Va. Code Ann. § 1-200 (2007). 
152 See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 875, 878 (Va. 1904). 
153 Id. at 879. 
154 Id. at 877, 879; see also Meredith v. Triple Island Gunning Club, 73 S.E. 721, 723 (Va. 
1912) (citing Taylor, 47 S.E. at 875, and noting that county laws governing the taking of 
game were designed with the good of all state citizens in mind). 
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Virginia courts were far from consistent in their application of this 
restriction during the following three decades.155 
 In 1932 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia decided Com-
monwealth v. City of Newport News, ruling that the Supreme Court of the 
United States erred in Martin v. Waddell and Illinois Central, hobbling 
the public trust doctrine in Virginia.156 In Newport News, the court nar-
rowed the powers of the public trust doctrine by holding that the 
State does not act as trustee for the public with respect to fishery re-
sources.157 Rather, the court determined that—unlike navigation and 
commerce—references in Illinois Central and forgoing state precedent 
to fishery as a right held in trust for the people were merely casual 
dicta.158 The court thereby unburdened the Virginia legislature of the 
need to comply with the Illinois Central mandate that states not dispose 
of public trust resources in such a way as to substantially impair the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.159 
 The Newport News court ruled that, following the American Revolu-
tion, the people of each original state came to possess “full and com-
plete dominion for governmental purposes over all the lands and waters 
within its territorial limits, and the full and complete proprietary right 
in all [those] lands and waters . . . .”160 This interpretation eviscerated 
the concept of preserving waterways in trust for public use that dates 
back millennia and is recognized all over the globe.161 The court found 
no limitations within the state or federal constitutions on the rights of 
the state legislature to allow tidal waters and their bottoms to be used for 
purposes leading inevitably to the destruction of their usefulness as fish-
                                                                                                                      
155 Sharon M. Kelly, Note, The Public Trust and the Constitution: Routes to Judicial Overview 
of Resource Management Decisions in Virginia, 75 Va. L. Rev. 895, 902–05 (1989). 
156 See Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 694–96 (Va. 1932); Kelly, 
supra note 155, at 905–06. 
157 164 S.E. at 699; see Kelly, supra note 155, at 908. Kelly discusses Newport’s classifica-
tion of navigation and commerce as incidents of the jus publicum and fishery as an incident 
of the jus privatum. Id. The jus publicum encompasses those rights which cannot be surren-
dered to private interests or substantially impaired, while the jus privatum refers simply to 
typical rights of private property. Id. 
158 Newport News, 164 S.E. at 698 n.5. 
159 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
160 164 S.E. at 695. 
161 See Wilkinson, supra note 116, at 429–431 (identifying the preservation of waterways 
for communal use as a thread running not just from the common law of England to the 
United States, but through societies as diverse and far-flung as medieval Europe; pre-
Christian Asia, Africa, and the Middle-East; and most Native American cultures). 
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eries:162 The city of Newport News was allowed to continue putting its 
coastal waters and underlying oyster beds to use as raw sewage dumps.163 
Even judged by the standards of 1932, the court in Newport News could 
be considered disingenuous in pleading ignorance as to the havoc their 
ruling would wreak on affected ecosystems.164 Today, however, we know 
that harms to individual species resonate throughout ecosystems and 
erode foundational ecosystem services which underpin not just the abil-
ity to fish for depleted species, but also the other traditional public trust 
interests of commerce and navigation.165 
b. Modern Virginia Public Trust Cases 
 Modern Virginia courts have declined to explicitly expand the nar-
row public trust duty imposed on the state in Newport News.166  Para-
doxically, however, some cases cite favorably to pre-Newport News cases 
which construed the trust more broadly, and to treatises describing the 
doctrine in similar broad terms.167 These cases have held that the state, 
bolstered by constitutional and statutory law, discussed below, has power 
under the public trust doctrine to govern the construction of wharves 
and docks over subaqueous lands held in trust for the benefit of the 
people.168 
 In Evelyn v. Commonwealth Marine Resources Commission, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals dedicated a footnote to the evolution of state constitu-
tional and statutory law after 1932, and an interpretation of the public 
trust doctrine that seemed critical of the perverse result of Newport 
                                                                                                                      
162 164 S.E. at 698–99. “The common rights in a public fishery are at all times subject 
to the disposal of the legislature, and it may deprive the public of the right at its pleasure. 
This may be done by . . . dealing with the water in such a way that the fishery is destroyed.” 
Id. at 699 (quoting Farnham on Waters § 407). 
163 Id. Discussion of the role of sewage pollution in the collapse of the Chesapeake 
Bay’s tradition-rich oyster fishery is beyond the scope of this Note. See Hargis & Haven, 
supra note 14, at 329; see also McCay, supra note 106, at 155–57 (outlining the tragic col-
lapse of oyster fisheries in New York and New Jersey, in large part a result of reckless con-
tamination of the fishery). 
164 See Brooks, Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 55–56 (discussing the conservation-
ist movement of the early twentieth century). 
165 See id. at 377; Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 15–16. 
166 See Newport News, 164 S.E. at 694; Palmer v. Commonwealth of Va. Marine Res. 
Comm’n, 628 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); Evelyn v. Commonwealth of Va. Marine 
Res. Comm’n, 621 S.E.2d 130, 137 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
167 Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Taylor v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 875, 877–79 (Va. 
1904)). 
168 See Palmer, 628 S.E.2d at 89. 
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News.169 Stopping short of defining the precise parameters of Virginia’s 
public trust doctrine, the court in Evelyn determined that the VMRC 
had acted properly in considering “a form of the public trust doctrine” 
in denying a permit application for a roofed structure built over public 
water.170 
 Similarly, in Palmer v. Commonwealth Marine Resources Commission, 
the Virginia Court of Appeals declared that the state’s definition of 
the public trust provides: 
[T]he state holds the land lying beneath public waters as 
trustee for the benefit of all citizens. As trustee, the state is re-
sponsible for proper management of the resource to ensure the preser-
vation and protection of all appropriate current and potential future 
uses, including potentially conflicting uses, by the public.171 
The VMRC properly considered this formulation of the public trust 
doctrine in its decision to deny a permit to construct a storage shed 
over public waters.172 These modern cases cast a ray of hope into the 
morass of menhaden management, hinting that interaction of com-
mon, constitutional, and statutory law might provide public trust pro-
tection for the foundational ecosystem services menhaden provide.173 
2. The Public Trust Doctrine in Virginia’s Constitution 
 Article XI, section 1 of the 1970 Virginia State Constitution pro-
vides: 
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and 
the use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public 
lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the pol-
                                                                                                                      
169 See Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 137 n.3. “Since . . . 1932, Virginia’s Constitution has been 
amended to require, inter alia, protection of the Commonwealth’s ‘waters from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people 
. . . .’” Id. The court went on to determine that consideration of the public trust doctrine 
was appropriate “when interpreting and applying all legislative enactments” in light of this 
constitutional amendment’s interaction with a statute requiring the legislature to consider 
the public’s interest in the subaqueous lands held in trust by it for the benefit of the pub-
lic. Id. 
170 See id. 
171 628 S.E.2d at 89 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). 
172 See id. 
173 See Klass, supra note 103, at 728–29 (noting that, “as the modern common law pub-
lic trust doctrine has developed since the 1970s, courts can now rely on that body of law to 
inform their interpretations of state constitutional law and statutory law”); Kelly, supra note 
155, at 916–17. 
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icy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize 
its natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites 
and buildings. Further, it shall be the Commonwealth’s pol-
icy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollu-
tion, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, 
and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.174 
Although courts have used this provision as guidance in determining 
the scope of the public’s rights to exploit resources and to affirm 
agency decisions to limit these rights,175 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has determined that article XI, section 1 is not self-executing.176 
The General Assembly may enact legislation to bring about the public 
policy declared in the provision, but absent such legislation courts are 
powerless to affect the mandate.177 It is clear that any legislation en-
acted to protect the menhaden population of the Chesapeake Bay 
would be within the authority granted to the General Assembly to 
bring Article XI’s policy mandate to life.178 
3. The Public Trust Doctrine in Virginia Statutory Law 
 The Virginia legislature adopted the common law of England by 
statute, subject to alteration by the General Assembly.179 Arguably, then, 
unless explicitly altered by the General Assembly, the public trust doc-
trine as it existed within the English common law lives on in the laws of 
Virginia.180 
 Beyond the general implication that adoption of the common law 
of England encompassed adoption of the traditional English public 
trust doctrine, recognizable public trust values do appear in Virginia 
                                                                                                                      
174 Va. Const. art. XI, § 1. 
175 See Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 137 n.3. 
176 Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Va. 1985). For a survey of envi-
ronmental and natural resources provisions in state constitutions, see Bret Adams et al., 
Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. Land Resources & 
Envtl. L. 73 (2002). 
177 Shockoe, 324 S.E.2d at 677; Adams et al., supra note 176, at 233 (describing the types 
of constitutional provisions deemed to be self-executing by Virginia courts); Kelly, supra 
note 155, at 913. 
178 Va. Const. art. XI, § 2; see Shockoe, 324 S.E.2d at 677. 
179 Va. Code Ann. § 1-200 (2007). This code section is often cited as § 1-10, its former 
location. Id. 
180 See Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 135. 
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statutes.181 Most notably, title 28.2, section 1200 of the Virginia Code 
provides: 
All the beds of the bays, rivers, creeks and the shores of the 
sea within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, not con-
veyed by special grant or compact according to law, shall re-
main the property of the Commonwealth and may be used as 
a common by all the people of the Commonwealth for the 
purpose of fishing, fowling, hunting, and taking and catching 
oysters and other shellfish.182 
Also, as the court in Evelyn pointed out, title 28.2, section 1205(A) of 
the Virginia Code requires Virginia Marine Resources Commission de-
liberations regarding permits for the use of state-owned bottomlands to 
be guided by article XI, section 1 of the constitution, as well as in a 
manner 
[C]onsistent with the public trust doctrine as defined by the 
common law of the Commonwealth adopted pursuant to § 1-
200 in order to protect and safeguard the public right to the 
use and enjoyment of the subaqueous lands of the Com-
monwealth held in trust by it for the benefit of the people as 
conferred by the public trust doctrine and the Constitution 
of Virginia.183 
Thus, a nascent conception of the public trust doctrine exists in Vir-
ginia’s statutes and constitution, which, if brought to life through ju-
dicial action, could protect menhaden-related foundational ecosystem 
services.184 
                                                                                                                      
181 See Va. Code Ann. § 28.2-1200 (2007). 
182 Id. 
183 Va. Code Ann. § 28.2-1205 (2007); see Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 135, 137 n.3. Public trust 
values are also recognizable in the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, which aims to protect 
the public interest in keeping the waters of the bay healthy, thereby promoting the general 
welfare of the people. See Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-2100 (2007). “Healthy state and local 
economies and a healthy Chesapeake Bay are integrally related; balanced economic devel-
opment and water quality protection are not mutually exclusive.” Id; see also Robert E. 
Baute, Jr., Note, Adrift Without a Paddle: The Present and Future of the Chesapeake Bay Preserva-
tion Act, 26 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 441, 475–76 (2001) (cautioning that al-
though its aim of correcting harms to the Chesapeake Bay caused by prolonged environ-
mental abuses were noble, lack of funding and lax, inconsistent enforcement could de-
claw the Act). 
184 See Klass, supra note 103, at 744 (arguing that “[the public trust doctrine] has de-
veloped with changing societal needs, and, like other common law doctrines, can look to 
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IV. Establishing Public Trust Protection for Menhaden’s 
Foundational Ecosystem Services 
A. Historical Public Trust Protection for Ecosystem Services 
1. Pre-1970 Case Law 
 In a sense, the public trust doctrine has always protected ecosystem 
services.185  Before the modern concept of the doctrine—and indeed 
before a scientifically precise understanding of the interrelatedness of 
ecosystem components—had crystallized, societies recognized public 
uses of waterways for thousands of years.186 Even the private property-
minded British, from whom we inherited our common law, recognized 
that a private right to the ecosystem service of food production could 
not be granted via exclusive fishing rights in navigable waters.187 
 Although the seminal federal public trust cases had the utilitar-
ian purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishing in mind,188 these 
purposes are either ecosystem services themselves, or are facilitated by 
underlying, foundational ecosystem services.189 The traditional public 
trust purpose of fishery—which today is inextricably bound up with 
the traditional public trust purpose of commerce—is the ecosystem 
service of food production.190 Fishery also finds essential foundational 
support in the ecosystem services of refugia,191 waste treatment, and 
biological control,192 among others.193 The traditional public trust 
purposes of commerce and navigation—which today are driven partly 
by recreational users—are built upon a foundation of ecosystem ser-
vices including pollution control, nutrient cycling, and habitat provi-
                                                                                                                      
policy statements and standards contained in state constitutions and environmental stat-
utes.”); Kelly, supra note 155, at 916–17. 
185 See Wilkinson, supra note 116, at 429–30 (discussing the long history of societies 
protecting the public’s right to water supply and water-related food production). 
186 Id. 
187 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 414 (1842); Sax I, supra note 98, at 475. 
188 See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1894). 
189 See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 & tbl.1. 
190 See id. at 254 tbl.1. 
191 The ecosystem service of refugia is exemplified by the provision of “[n]urseries, 
habitat for migratory species, [and] regional habitats for locally harvested species . . . .” Id. 
192 Biological control includes “[k]eystone predator control of prey species, [and] re-
duction of herbivory by top predators.” Id. Menhaden’s reduction of hypoxia-generating 
phytoplankton through filter-feeding is an example of biological control. See Franklin, 
supra note 3, at 43. 
193 See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 & tbl.1. 
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sion.194 Recreational and commercial navigation and fishing are 
unlikely to be popular uses of murky, lifeless waters.195 
 Therefore, failure to sustain the provision of foundational ecosys-
tem services like those mentioned above erodes the general public’s 
interest in the traditional public trust purposes of navigation, com-
merce, and fishery.196 People’s motivations to navigate, as well as modes 
of water-based commerce, have evolved and expanded since early set-
tlers used the country’s waterways for exploration, transport, and 
trade.197 The formulation of the public trust doctrine laid down in Illi-
nois Central Railroad v. Illinois does not, however, discriminate against 
increasingly recreation- and culture-driven modes and objectives of 
navigation and commerce in prohibiting substantial impairment of the 
public’s use and enjoyment of them.198 
 Pre-1970 state court cases added flesh to the Illinois Central and 
Shively v. Bowlby public trust doctrine skeleton and protected diffuse 
public interests in ecosystem services.199 In Gould v. Greylock Reservation 
Commission, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overrode an 
agency’s grant of land for the purpose of building a ski resort in part 
because the clearing of land would “[have] ‘a definite effect upon the 
ecology for some distance back from the edge of the clearing.’”200 The 
Massachusetts court did not point to specific forest-related ecosystem 
services—nutrient cycling, waste treatment, recreation—but it did ex-
plicitly mention protection of the forest ecology as a factor in their 
decision to invalidate the ski resort lease.201 
 Early Wisconsin cases, too, recognized that destruction of ecosys-
tem services by filling or draining wetlands would violate the public 
                                                                                                                      
194 See id. 
195 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 43 (describing the swamp ecology that can result 
when a marine ecosystem is subjected to the most extreme deprivation of ecosystem ser-
vices); NSTC Assessment, supra note 40, at 2 (outlining the “wide range of potential nega-
tive effects resulting from eutrophication”). 
196 See Russell, supra note 38, at 226–27; Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 tbl.1. 
197 See Wilkinson, supra note 116, at 431–34; see also Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 
tbl.1. Costanza lists “[e]co-tourism, sport fishing, and other outdoor recreational activities” 
such as, say, whale- or bird-watching, and “[a]esthetic, artistic, educational, spiritual, 
and/or scientific values of ecosystems” among recreational and cultural ecosystem services, 
which help support some modern applications of commerce and navigation. Id. 
198 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); Wilkinson, supra note 
116, at 461; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 
P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing that certain services provided by the Mono Lake 
ecosystem amounted to important public uses, protected by the public trust). 
199 Sax I, supra note 98, at 557–58. 
200 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 122–23 (Mass. 1966). 
201 Id. 
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trust.202 In 1924 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reaffirmed its stance 
that navigable waters “should be free to all for commerce, for travel, for 
recreation, and also for hunting and fishing, which are now mainly cer-
tain forms of recreation.”203 
2. 1970s Case Law 
 Against the backdrop of the environmentalist movement of the 
1970s, state courts broadened the scope of public trust protection.204 
This charge, taken up by several states with California and Wisconsin 
in the lead, engendered a broadening of resources protected by the 
public trust doctrine, and reflected a realization that protection of 
traditional public trust rights would be hollow without protection of 
the foundational ecosystem services underpinning those rights.205 
 The simple logic of People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo is 
seen again in the famous California public trust case, Marks v. Whit-
ney.206 The court there implicitly recognized the value of ecosystem 
services provided by tidelands preserved in their natural state.207 The 
tideland ecosystem service of providing food and habitat for birds and 
marine life is foundational with respect to the traditional public trust 
purpose of fishery, and is also the impetus for several types of modern 
commerce and navigation.208 Ecosystem services that enhance the 
scenery and climate of an area are foundational with respect to the 
traditional public right to navigation in public waters.209 Failure to 
protect such foundational ecosystem services could result in there be-
ing no useful traditional public trust purposes left to enjoy.210 
                                                                                                                      
202 See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
203 In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874, 876 (Wis. 1924) 
(quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)). Costanza et al. 
consider “[e]co-tourism, sport fishing, and other outdoor recreational activities” to be part 
of the ecosystem service of recreation, and hunting and fishing to be part of the ecosystem 
service of food production. See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 tbl.1. 
204 E.g., Klass, supra note 103, at 707–08. The 1970s saw the celebration of the first 
Earth Day and the development of an increasingly confident community of ecosystem 
ecologists. See Brooks, Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 9. 
205 See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
206 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
207 See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
208 See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 tbl.1. 
209 See id. 
210 See McCay, supra note 106, at 155–56 (discussing the collapse of New Jersey’s oyster 
fishery in the early part of the twentieth century). 
164 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:135 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion re-
garding the value of wetlands in Just v. Marinette County.211 The court’s 
forceful ruling in favor of protection of ecosystem services via the 
public trust doctrine is another example of judicial recognition of 
those services’ foundational position with respect to traditional public 
trust resources.212 The court implied that water-purifying wetlands 
should be protected under the public trust doctrine because without 
pure water, few people would want to exercise their traditional public 
rights to fishery and navigation—all the fish being dead or elsewhere, 
and the water being too foul to enjoy recreational navigation over.213 
3. Mono Lake and Beyond 
 The Supreme Court of California examined Mono Lake’s ability 
to continue to provide certain ecosystem services in ruling that diver-
sions of water from the lake to Los Angeles had to be reexamined in 
light of the public trust doctrine.214 Continued depletion of the lake’s 
fresh water had to be weighed against degradation of the lake’s ability 
to provide public trust resources as a fishery and source of great sce-
nic, recreational, and ecological value.215 The court flatly rejected the 
contention that the state could use the trust resource of the lake as it 
wished, and to the extent that the ecosystem services that gave it 
much of its value would inevitably be destroyed.216 
 The Supreme Court of Hawaii built on the National Audubon Soci-
ety v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake) decision when they 
prohibited harmful water allocations from being made under the 
banner of scientific uncertainty.217 By encouraging use of the precau-
tionary principle to govern off-stream water uses, the court recog-
nized the importance of the services provided by the estuary ecosys-
tem.218 
                                                                                                                      
211 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972). 
212 See id. The court focused on the ecosystem service of water purification as provided 
by swamps and other wetlands. Id. 
213 See id. 
214 See supra Part III.C.3. 
215 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 
719, 724 (Cal. 1983). 
216 Id. at 723–24. 
217 See In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 470–71 (Haw. 
2000). 
218 See id. 
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B. Bringing Menhaden’s Services Beneath the Public Trust Umbrella 
1. Being Eaten 
 Menhaden have a rich history of contributing foundational eco-
system services in support of public trust resources along the Atlantic 
coast of the United States.219 Menhaden were first recognized for 
their ability to provide a food source for vast numbers of predators, 
including fish, birds, and marine mammals.220 The species is an essen-
tial part of the diets of popular game fish such as striped bass.221 
 Provision of food to predators is a foundational ecosystem service 
that supports the traditional public trust purposes of fishing, naviga-
tion, and commerce.222 That a healthy menhaden population sup-
ports fisheries through its role in the food web is obvious. Menhaden 
are the preferred meal of many favorite seafood species in the wild, as 
well as being one of the favorite baits of lobster and crab fishermen all 
along the east coast.223 Unsustainable exploitation of the menhaden 
population in the Chesapeake Bay will result in scarcity of these desir-
able food fish.224 
 Beyond supporting healthy fisheries, a population of menhaden 
capable of providing the ecosystem service of feeding predators con-
tributes to the viability of the traditional public trust resources of 
commerce and navigation.225 Recreational anglers exercise their pub-
lic trust right to navigation when they fish from boats.226 Commercial 
enterprises, including private fishing charters, communal fishing 
boats, whale-watching vessels, and certain eco-tourism vessels would 
have little reason to ply their trades over the navigable waters of the 
Chesapeake if it weren’t for the foundational ecosystem services pro-
                                                                                                                      
219 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
220 See supra Part II.A.2. 
221 See Russell, supra note 38, at 226–27. 
222 See id. at 29–34. 
223 Id. at 29. 
224 See Russell, supra note 38, at 213–14; Gottlieb, Ecological Role of Atlantic Menha-
den, supra note 3, at 83–84. 
225 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 218–19. The author describes the “stunning resur-
gence” of menhaden and the commercially exploitable species which rely on them in New 
Jersey waters following a ban on Omega’s operations there. Id.; see also Bell, supra note 81, 
at C1 (discussing a ban on coastal trawling for herring in Maine that may be responsible 
for a rebound in the abundance and diversity of sea life in those waters, much to the de-
light of the coalition of “conservationists, tuna fishermen, lobstermen, charter fishing 
boats, sport fishermen and whale-watching companies” who supported the ban). 
226 See Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914). 
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vided by menhaden.227 Thus, menhaden’s provision of the essential 
foundational ecosystem service of food web support allows the tradi-
tional public trust rights of fishery, navigation, and commerce to be 
enjoyed by the public on the Chesapeake Bay.228 
2. Eating 
 The other foundational ecosystem services menhaden provide 
stem from their voracious appetites.229 Filter feeding by menhaden 
helps to mitigate factors that have led to the expansion of areas where 
dissolved oxygen has become too scarce to support life—dead zones— 
within the Chesapeake Bay.230 Expansion of these dead zones lessens 
public access to traditional public trust purposes whose value is derived 
from the presence of abundant marine life in those areas.231 
 Thus, menhaden’s ecosystem services are far from being of inter-
est only to environmental “protectionists.”232 Rather, they represent 
bricks in the growing edifice of public awareness as to the interrelat-
edness of healthy natural systems and the economic, social, and cul-
tural well-being of the human population.233 Indeed, the ability of the 
general public to enjoy their rights to fish, navigate, and conduct 
commerce over the waters of the Chesapeake Bay are contracting 
along with the expansion of hypoxic and anoxic zones.234 Protection 
of menhaden is not a panacea for the complex and daunting stresses 
the Chesapeake Bay faces.235 That does not mean, however, that the 
foundational ecosystem services provided by menhaden in support of 
                                                                                                                      
227 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 29, 218–19. 
228 See Russell, supra note 38, at 215. 
229 Supra Part II.A.1. The average adult menhaden can filter around fifteen liters of wa-
ter every minute. Sara J. Gottlieb, Nutrient Removal by Age-0 Atlantic Menhaden (Brevoortia 
Tyrranus) in Chesapeake Bay and Implications for Seasonal Management of the Fishery, 112 Eco-
logical Modeling 111, 112 (1998). Gottlieb’s study addresses the concern that the re-
duction fishery is removing too many pre-spawning age fish from the population, thereby 
compromising the stock’s long-term viability. See id. at 112–13. 
230 NSTC Assessment, supra note 40, at 24–26. 
231 Russell, supra note 38, at 239. “During the two summer weeks [in 2003] when the 
‘dead zone’ was at its greatest extent, watermen spoke of blue crabs dying in their pots, of 
red tides wiping out oyster beds, of striped bass disappearing from their customary habi-
tats.” Id. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 
724 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing the public’s interest in its “common heritage of streams, 
lakes, marshlands and tidelands” as being protected by the public trust). 
232 See Russell, supra note 38, at 224. 
233 See Brooks, Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
234 See Franklin, supra note 3, at 138–39. 
235 James Price, Chesapeake Bay Ecological Foundation, Inc., Chesapeake Bay 
an Undeclared Ecological Disaster, (2008), http://www.chesbay.org/articles/3.asp. 
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traditional public trust rights should be co-opted by a corporate mo-
nopolist for its short-term benefit.236 
C. Capturing Menhaden’s Ecosystem Services With Virginia’s  
Ragged Public Trust Net 
 Virginia courts have largely declined to heed Professor Sax’s sug-
gestion that judicial intervention using the public trust doctrine be 
used as an instrument of democratization in a broad range of natural 
resource cases.237 It would be a mistake, however, to claim that case law 
in Virginia has not evolved along with the public’s environmental 
ethos since the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that using oyster beds 
“for discharge into them of sewage is a public use.”238 An understand-
ing of the role that healthy ecosystems play in maintaining human 
quality of life—including components of quality of life derived from 
traditional public trust purposes—has developed since the early days 
of the environmental movement.239 
 The 1932 ruling in Commonwealth v. City of Newport News does not 
foreclose the possibility of protecting menhaden through use of Vir-
ginia’s public trust doctrine.240 The court in Newport News ruled that 
the legislature, “in the absence of any constitutional provision on the 
subject, has the right to . . . authorize, permit, or suffer its tidal waters 
or their bottoms to be used for purposes which impair or even destroy 
their use for purposes of fishery[.]”241 The court did not consider a 
factor that we are in a much better position to evaluate today with re-
spect to the Chesapeake Bay menhaden population: the extent to 
which a ruling sanctioning the destruction of the Chesapeake Bay oys-
ter population also undermined the foundational ecosystem services 
provided by that resource.242 The court would stand on solid ground 
today were it to overrule Newport News. Such action would be proper 
                                                                                                                      
236 See Russell, supra note 38, at 230–32. 
237 See Kelly, supra note 155, at 916–17. 
238 See Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 699 (Va. 1932); Brooks, 
Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 6. 
239 See Brooks, Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 5–6; Gottlieb, Ecological Role of At-
lantic Menhaden, supra note 3, at 13–16. 
240 See Kelly, supra note 155, at 916–17. 
241 Newport News, 164 S.E. at 699. 
242 See id. at 700. “[T]he General Assembly has the power to authorize, permit, or suf-
fer sewage to be discharged into Hampton Roads and its estuaries, and to subject the dis-
charge . . . to no restrictions relative to its injury to fishery therein . . . .” Id. 
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because destruction of fisheries—like those for oysters and menha-
den—have resonant effects within ecosystems.243 Given the evolution 
of the science of ecology since Newport News, the result in that case is 
offensive to even the narrowest reading of the public trust doctrine.244 
Newport News sanctions the destruction of foundational ecosystem ser-
vices by the legislature, in derogation of its duty to protect the public’s 
diffuse interest in traditional public trust purposes—including com-
merce, navigation, and fishing—supported by those services.245 
 Should the court refuse to take the bold step of overruling Newport 
News, remanding the legislature’s illusory cap on the Chesapeake Bay 
menhaden “harvest” would still be proper.246 The court could require 
reconsideration of the cap based on a finding that, given our under-
standing of ecology in 2008, the public trust purposes of commerce and 
navigation—both incidents of the jus publicum in Virginia according to 
Newport News—are substantially impaired by allowing their foundation 
of ecosystem services to crumble.247 
 Finally, the current prevailing legal assumption in Virginia con-
cerning the public trust doctrine seems to be that evolutions in consti-
tutional and statutory law since 1932 have allowed for application of a 
doctrine broader than that laid down in Newport News.248 In 2005, the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia noted in Evelyn v. Commonwealth that New-
port News dictated that “except as is otherwise expressly or impliedly 
provided by the Constitution, what is for the benefit of the people is 
committed to [the legislature’s] discretion free from the control or dic-
tation of the executive or judicial department of the government.”249 
The court in Evelyn recognized that what Virginia’s constitution pro-
vides changed between 1932 and 2005.250 They examined Article XI, 
adopted in 1970, and found that it “require[s], inter alia, protection of 
                                                                                                                      
243 See Brooks, Jones & Virginia, supra note 1, at 7. 
244 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 8, at 230. 
245 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 8, at 236–37; Kelly, supra note 155, at 917. 
246 See Kelly, supra note 155, at 911–12 (discussing resource uses that may have become 
part of the jus publicum since 1932, and which would therefore be protected under the 
Newport News standard). 
247 See id.; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 8, at 232–33, 236–37. 
248 See Palmer v. Commonwealth of Va. Marine Res. Comm’n, 628 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2006); Evelyn v. Commonwealth of Va. Marine Res. Comm’n, 621 S.E.2d 130, 137 & 
n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
249 Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 137 n.3 (quoting Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 
S.E. 689, 697 (Va. 1932)) (alteration in original). 
250 Id. 
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the Commonwealth’s ‘waters from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of 
the Commonwealth.’”251 The court went on to find vested in the legisla-
ture an “express duty to ‘safeguard the public right to the use and en-
joyment of the subaqueous lands of the Commonwealth held in trust by 
it for the benefit of the public as conferred by the public trust doctrine 
and the Constitution of Virginia[.]’”252 The court held that it is appro-
priate for the judiciary to consider that express duty in its interpretation 
of all legislative enactments.253 
 The result in Evelyn suggests that—insofar as the reduction indus-
try threatens the ability of menhaden to continue providing founda-
tional ecosystem services essential to the public’s use and enjoyment 
of public trust resources—the court should remand the illusory cap 
on the industry’s catch to the legislature for reconsideration in light of 
the public trust doctrine.254 
Conclusion 
 The ecosystem services of nutrient cycling, waste treatment, and 
food web support provided by menhaden help form the foundation for 
the traditional public trust interests of commerce, navigation, and fish-
ery across the waters of Chesapeake Bay. Allowing a monopolistic 
commercial venture to vacuum vast schools of menhaden from the bay 
impairs the public’s interest in its waters by eroding this foundation. 
 Scientific understanding of ecology and the interconnectedness 
of natural systems has grown since 1932, as has the realization that 
ecosystem services provide humans with irreplaceable social and eco-
nomic value. Based on this expansion of knowledge, and upon the 
evolution of Virginia’s public trust jurisprudence, a court would be 
justified in remanding the non-functioning cap on the menhaden 
harvest to the legislature for re-examination. Protecting modern itera-
tions of traditional public trust interests requires protection of the 
ecosystem services upon which those interests are based. The stakes 
are too high for the legislature to continue hiding behind a dubious 
cloak of scientific uncertainty. 
                                                                                                                      
251 Id. (quoting Va. Const. art. XI, § 1). 
252 See id. (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 28.2-1205(A) (2007)). 
253 Id. 
254 See id.; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 8, at 236–37. 
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